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Military Mobilisation and National Identity in the Soviet Union

Timothy K. Blauvelt

One of the more contentious questions related to the political development of states involves the role of warfare. The *garrison state* school of thought argues that states which face a constant threat of invasion will develop autocratic institutions in order to ensure the security of the state. In the face of external threat, military mobilisation will lead to further centralisation, restrictions on rights and freedoms, and suppression of possible rival elites and rival sources of identification.[1] On the other hand, what might be called the *resource extraction* school argues that the opposite can be the case, in that regimes are often forced to extend economic or political rights in exchange for the mobilisation of human and financial resources to meet the immediate threat.[2] With the rise of the modern national army, the political indoctrination necessary for mobilisation will instil a sense of patriotism that motivates soldiers to fight, not for pay, but for their nation. The public is also involved in the immense effort of modern war, and begins to conceive of itself as citizens rather than subjects. While peace can lead to demobilisation of the majority of the military, this new sense of identity would remain. Meanwhile, participation in the military and the war effort can encourage previously second-class citizens and ethnic groups to question the basic inequalities in society, and can also serve as a means of upward social mobility for members of these groups and social strata. While making no pretence at confirming or repudiating these competing approaches, this article will examine their relative strengths through a case study of a particularly authoritarian state by examining the role of war and mobilisation of national minorities for major war in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. It describes the role of minority groups in the military, identifies the positions of the minority groups in the political hierarchy, and traces the impact of the mobilisation for war on minority groups—as well as the effect that this has on regime itself.

1. O. Hintze, *Historical Essays of Otto Hinze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1906 [1975]); H. Lasswell, 'The Garrison State', *American Journal of Sociology* 46: 4 (1941), 455–67; H. Lasswell, *Essays on the Garrison State*, ed. J. Stanley (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); P. Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: New Left Books, 1974).

2. B. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

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Both the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia before it were in essence multinational empires, encompassing hundreds of ethnic groups representing European, Islamic and Asian heritages. Like many empires, however, both the Soviet Union and Russia had a single politically and culturally dominant people at its centre: the 'greater Russian' Slavs (Russians, Belorussians, Eastern Ukrainians). Despite the Marxist ideological predisposition of the founders of the Soviet Union to regard nationality as irrelevant and subordinate to class interests, the Soviet authorities found themselves wrestling with the same kinds of ethnicity related dilemmas that vexed their Imperial Russian predecessors. The Soviets' response was to utilise the alternating strategies of the offering of concessions and forceful repression, while at the same time following the traditional practice of bifurcating their policy toward non-Russian minorities by dividing them into loyal and unreliable elements and dealing with them according to these two categories. Because of this policy of bifurcation, the best way to study centre–periphery relations is to deal with national minorities as a whole rather than examining or comparing one or two groups.

THE NATIONAL MINORITIES IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA

The Russian empire followed the common practice of nineteenth-century multiethnic nations and left the social structures of conquered or annexed peoples and territories relatively intact. The tsars were content to oversee these ethnic groups and extract their loyalty by coopting part of the indigenous elites as a means to establish indirect rule, and to pursue the assimilation of these peoples by long-term administrative adaptation and migration.[3]

Yet in its policies toward ethnic minorities, as in many areas of its administration, the tsarist system displayed a rigidity and an inability to adapt to the profound changes that were taking place domestically and internationally in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, the collapse of that system was intimately connected with the growth of nationalist movements in the non-Russian parts of the empire. The fact that Russia essentially became an empire before it was ever a nation led Russia to an inherent definition of itself in terms of a nation encompassing subjects—which made it difficult or impossible for both liberals and conservatives in the Russian government and intelligentsia to conceptualise nationalism on the part of the empire's subject peoples. It was primarily the socialists, on the radical left of the Russian intelligentsia, who embraced the ideas of national autonomy and independence. National movements for liberation in turn, albeit in an abstract conception, formed a central part of the

3. G. Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 20. See also Joshua A. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics 1905–1925* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003). This work was published too late to be used in the preparation of this article.

revolutionary movement as a whole.[4] Conversely, as ethnic conflict in the Russian Empire tended to run along social lines, there was a strong socialist aspect to the budding nationalist movements in many parts of the empire. For these movements, nationalism was a means of human liberation from oppression and foreign domination.

Nonetheless, before the First World War, there was little conception of nationality in general, except among intellectuals. Localised forms of identity were more prevalent, especially in the muslim regions of the Caucasus and in Central Asia, where tribal fiefdoms remained dominant despite the superimposition of tsarist administrative structures. Yet even in the more advanced regions of European Russia, Poland and the Ukraine, national consciousness was an intellectual conception that was imported from the West, and its supporters championed such westernising factors as secular mass education, urbanisation, the development of trade and industry, civic society and the extension of language rights.[5]

Cultural nationalism in its intellectual form did not necessarily imply national independence. But the rigidity of tsarism did not allow it to tolerate cultural autonomy in any form. According to the self-definition of the tsarist system, non-Russian peoples must be subordinated to Russia's cultural domination. The empire's reaction to the development of these nationalist movements, a policy of russification, in turn politicised the nationalist movements and made them into enemies of the regime. The goal of this russification policy was to assimilate the non-Russian peoples into the Russian cultural and political system in a system of ethnic hierarchy that paralleled the existing social hierarchy. Nationalities were ranked in accordance with their perceived loyalty to the tsar, and each was given a different set of legal rights and privileges. The top positions in the civil and military hierarchies were held by Russians and Baltic Germans, followed in order of rank by Poles, Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians, with the Jews at the bottom.[6] Caucasian muslims and Central Asians did not even make the scale.

In most of these regions, particularly in the muslim territories, nationalist movements were still in the early stages by the time the First World War began, and had not yet become mass movements. Nevertheless, as was also the case in the Austro–Hungarian and Ottoman empires, crises tend to transform diffuse national aspirations into successful political programmes.

4. This point is made particularly well by O. Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1918–1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 70–1.

5. For a more thorough discussion of this, see ibid., 71–81.

6. Ibid., 80.

MINORITIES AND THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN MILITARY

As a multi-national empire, yet one in a precarious international environment, Imperial Russia required the recruitment of military personnel from among the national minorities. Traditionally the tsarist regime approached the recruitment of national minorities into the military in a bifurcated fashion. As far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, those nationalities that were considered loyal to the regime were conscripted while the unreliable elements were excluded from service in the regular army. The Caucasians, North Caucasians, Western Ukrainians and Central Asians, in particular, were generally considered inherently disloyal to the regime and were excluded from military service. Some national units were created from these groups under the tsars, as well as later under the Bolsheviks, but their loyalty was always highly suspect. Meanwhile, Christian Eastern Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians and Ossetians enjoyed distinguished careers in the tsarist army. For the most part, non-Russians continued to serve in auxiliary units, or 'troops of different nationalities' [*inorodicheskie voiska*].[7] Because of concerns that muslims, who were over-represented in these auxiliary units, might side with the local population during the Russian drive into Central Asia, the numbers of national troops were reduced dramatically throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.[8]

Nevertheless, traditionally the Russian leadership has needed to draw on the support of minority troops to defend the country, conduct foreign campaigns, and to perform internal police functions. The authorities were therefore consistently forced to deal with the continuous struggle to balance the inherent advantages and disadvantages of a multinational military. Segregating minorities into ethnically distinct units solved the language problem and allowed the deployment of ethnically antagonistic units to suppress rebellions in any given area of the empire. This segregation, however, complicated the issues of reliability and control, and tended to solidify ethnic and local conceptions of identity.

FIRST WORLD WAR, REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

The First World War tested the tsarist social and military systems severely, and required the commitment of all available personnel and resources. Because of the desperate need for manpower, the regime was forced to accept the political risks associated with the formation of clearly identifiable national military units.

Revolutionary fervour among the minority soldiers of the Imperial Army, stirred up by the radical left, contributed significantly to the military's

7. A. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush (eds), *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army: Asset or Liability?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); L. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX veke: Voenno-ekonomicheskii potentsial Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973).

8. Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 16.

disintegration and to the loss of its combat effectiveness at the front.[9] Universal conscription of Central Asians and Caucasian muslims began for the first time in 1916, and Central Asians were to serve in the rear as support troops, thus freeing up Slavs for combat roles at the front. The scope of the army's demands, the fact that they were made at the height of the cotton season along with the muslims' reluctance to serve in the Russian Army, where they believed they would be forced to eat pork and become contaminated by association with non-believers, were the motivating factors behind the great Central Asian rebellion of 1916. The regime was only able to put down this revolt with the help of the Cossacks and they were forced to accept a much lower number of Central Asian recruits than expected when conscription was finally put into effect.[10] Many of the Tatars conscripted in to the Russian Army deserted, and the existing tension in that region was heightened by the efforts of émigré Tatar leaders in Turkey, which led to an attempt at local autonomy and the creation of a federation of Ural–Volga states in 1917.[11] Strong nationalist and separatist trends also began to emerge among Crimean Tatars in 1917, which led similarly to attempts to set up an independent state.

The period of the Civil War following the October Revolution and the withdrawal from the war in Europe was chaotic and fluid, and it provided a brief opportunity for the diverse ethnic groups of the former empire to assert, and to struggle to realise, their individual national aspirations. Both the Reds and the Whites in the Civil War sought the support of the nationalities, and the national minorities in turn viewed their participation in the war as a means to fulfill their own national goals. The Reds, with their ideologically propounded claims to national self-determination, were much more successful at winning over the ethnic groups than the Whites, who were hampered by their overt Russian chauvinism and *status quo ante* intentions.

Thus the Bolsheviks won the Civil War, in part, because they were willing to concede a great deal to the nationalities apart from outright secession. The Whites were uncompromising in their ideal of a 'one and undivided Russia', which made a permanent coalition with the non-Russian national movements impossible.[12] Despite recruiting large contingents of minorities into the Red Army, however, the Bolsheviks were faced with a series of uprisings, especially in the Transcaucasus and the Islamic guerrilla [*Basmachi*] rebellion in Central Asia, and were forced to make concessions.[13] The Bolsheviks allowed the use of

9. T. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Brotherhood in Arms: The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces', in N.F. Dreiszinger (ed.), *Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic Armed Forces from the Time of the Hapsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers* (Toronto: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1990), 123–57.

10. Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 20.

11. S. Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1983).

12. Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities*, 21.

13. Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 33–5; Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 710–11.

the *sharia* law code in Dagestan to counteract the anti-Soviet uprising under Uzan Haji, a leader of the Sufi brotherhoods of the North Caucasus from 1919 to 1921. In 1919 *sharia* courts were re-instituted and mosques and religious schools were returned to the Islamic clergy throughout Central Asia. The Reds concluded that without these concessions, they could not win the fight against the *Basmachi,* which nevertheless lasted until the late 1920s.[14]

The Bolshevik leadership during the Civil War clarified its position on the two important issues of the role of the party and the role of the military in the nation-building process: nation-building was limited to recruiting non-Russians into the party and the army. Any attempt at separation from the central organisation, or at raising national armed forces in addition to those in the Red Army, or at founding autonomous national parties independent of the Bolsheviks was clearly going too far. Lenin and Stalin were very much aware of the disintegration of the Social Democratic Party of the Austro–Hungarian Empire along ethnic lines shortly before the First World War, and were determined not to let the same thing happen to their party.[15]

In all national territories that the Red Army conquered during the Civil War, the Soviets forced all the socialist parties that had emerged locally to dissolve. Similarly, national armed forces were either incorporated into the Red Army or demobilised. The Bolsheviks, however, did think it necessary to make concessions on the issue of the self-administration of state organs and the economy—concessions that were clearly made to counteract national ambitions.

Following the inception of the Red Army in January 1918, national units were formed in the newly established western borderlands of Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In Tatarstan and Bashkiria pro-Soviet muslim military units were formed in Kazan in 1918 under the command of Russian officers. These armies were willing to cooperate with the Red Army, but they were unwilling to give up their national autonomy for the sake of this cooperation. Later Soviet sources admitted that separatism was rampant in these armies, and the Bolsheviks had to move quickly to subordinate them to Red

14. The issue of how long the *Basmachi* rebellions continued seems to be somewhat contentious. According to official Soviet sources the uprising was extinguished by 1924: Olaf Caroe, *The Soviet Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 101. Simon, in *Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities*, 22, maintains that it ended in 1926. Other historians similarly argue that the uprisings were 'virtually liquidated' by 1923, and although they 'continued for several years' after that time 'the problem presented by the rebels was resolved in a manner satisfactory enough to allow the Soviet government to begin the work of integrating Central Asia with the Union': Helene Carrere D'Encausse, 'Civil War and New Governments', in Edward Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 253; and Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 711. Other sources see the rebellion continuing until the succumbing of Ibrahim Beg in 1931: Caroe, *The Soviet Empire*, 101.

15. Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, 372.

Army command.[16] All military units were placed under the command of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic's revolutionary military council in May 1919, and a unified command system was established the following June.[17] It took much longer for some of the western Ukrainian units to be incorporated into the Red Army. After the Red Army reconquered the Transcaucasus in 1920–21, the pro-Soviet Muslim national units, which contributed significantly to the Reds' victory in the Civil War, were dissolved as separate entities.[18]

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

State institutional structure and majority/minority relations

Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership well understood the potential of the national minorities and used this understanding to advantage in facilitating the breakup of the Empire through the advocacy of the right of the rebellious minorities to national self-determination. As the Bolsheviks evolved from political radicals to acting party of power following the Reds' victory in the Civil War and began building their new Soviet state, they were forced to develop new strategies to limit the influence of the national movements.

The existence of national minorities was always a political and ideological nuisance for the Soviet Union's Bolshevik leadership. According to Marxist theory, nationalism is a bourgeois condition that presents an obstacle to revolutionary consciousness. In the words of Lenin, 'workers know no fatherland'. In order to counter nationalist sentiment, both Lenin and Stalin modified the principle of national self-determination by subordinating it to the principle of class unity, arguing that 'the interests of socialism are higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-definition'.[19]

In the aftermath of the Civil War, however, the Bolsheviks realised that some concessions were necessary to fulfil the promises that had been made to the pro-Soviet minorities and to win over the rest of the minority peoples to the revolution. After 1921 Soviet power was established only tentatively in many non-Russian territories, and barely existed in Central Asia. The leading policy of this concessionary approach was the policy of *korenizatsiia*, or 'rooting-in', which involved bringing indigenous elites into the mechanism of local govern-

16. S. Kliatskin, *Na zashchite Oktiabriia: organizatsiia reguliarnoi armii i militsionnoe stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoi respublike* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 134.

17. I. Mints (ed.), *Boevoe sodruzhestvo Sovetskikh respublik 1919–1922* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), 161–3.

18. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Brotherhood in Arms', 35.

19. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 26 (Moscow: Progress, 1970), 449.

ment and party organisations while at the same time encouraging local languages and intellectual cultures.[20]

The Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 resolved to help non-Russian peoples to develop and consolidate their Soviet statehood in forms appropriate to their national characteristics and way of life; to develop and consolidate judicial, administrative, economic and governmental bodies operating in the native language and composed of local people who knew the way of life and psychology of the local population; to develop the press, schools, theatres, clubs and cultural institutions in general in the native language; and to establish and develop a wide network of general and technical–professional courses and schools in the native language.[21]

Lenin, always an astute political pragmatist, saw temporary political concessions to the language and nationality issue as a means of coping with the complex and difficult nationalities problem inherited from the tsarist empire. Faced with the problem of creating among these widely varied peoples a sense of loyalty to the revolutionary ideas that had triumphed in the more urbanised and industrialised central Russian areas, Lenin undertook a rethinking of the Bolshevik attitude toward federalism and also to the creation of an extensive system of organisation and representation of the various nationalities, the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs [*Narkomnats*] and the Council of Nationalities. This approach proved to be a convenient method of political control, and also demonstrated the tremendous idealism of the Bolsheviks about the triumph of the revolution and its imminent spread throughout the world and about the task of making the equality of peoples and languages into a living practical reality.

Because of his ideological convictions and aspirations, Lenin was quite wary of the legacy and potential danger of greater Russian chauvinism. Nevertheless, for reasons of pragmatism, Lenin insisted upon a Russian-centred—though less Russian-dominated—arrangement for the empire the Bolsheviks had inherited in order to overcome the strong resistance to Bolshevism among the Ukrainians, Central Asians and Transcaucasians, who had already demonstrated powerful separatist tendencies. With the Communist Party as the instrument of integration, Lenin opted for a union of separate republics reflecting national differences as a compromise stage prior to the attainment of general sovietisation.[22] The Soviet Union, as it emerged officially at the end of 1922, was in essence a compromise between ideology and reality. It was an attempt to reconcile the Bolshevik strivings for unity and centralisation of power with the

20. G. Smith, 'The Soviet State and Nationalities Policy', in Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the post-Soviet States*, second edn (London: Longman, 1996), 7.

21. *KPRF v resoliutsiiakh* (Moscow: Progress, 1970), 252.

22. B. Huttenback (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies* (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 22.

recognition that nationalism did survive the collapse of the old order.[23] Nevertheless, massive bureaucratic institutions were created, emanating from the centre with symmetrical vertical lines of authority reaching down to the local level.

Thus Lenin's shift from a policy of regional autonomy to one of assimilation foreshadowed more ominous developments after his death. The accession to power of Stalin lead to a deterioration of national rights in the Soviet Union. By the mid 1930s, the national egalitarianism of Lenin had become national regimentation and hierarchy.

Minorities and the Red Army in the Interwar Period

Following the Civil War, the Soviet leadership needed to demobilise the military. The national units who had backed the Reds, however, wanted their promises fulfilled. Although the minorities were denied the right to form national armies, the centre compromised by agreeing to maintain and raise national units that would be strictly subordinated to the Moscow-based chain of command.

Most of the national units had originated during the Civil War, and during the 1920s they existed in all the union republics and in many autonomous republics in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics. Most of the non-commissioned officers, middle ranks, and nearly all the political officers were indigenous. At no time, however, did all or even the majority of non-Russian soldiers serve in the national units, which probably never numbered significantly more than ten per cent of the Red Army's effective strength. The national units made it possible to draft non-Russian speaking recruits from Central Asia, where compulsory service was only introduced in 1931, and also allowed the growth of a class of non-Russian career officers and NCOs. With this in mind, the Red Army created several special training facilities in the military and political sector for these officers.[24] The military was thus incorporated into the policy of *korenizatsiia* which was designed to bring minority cadres into the state and party *apparati* in the minority areas. This resulted in the coexistence—under a unified command—of a cadre army within territorial national minority formations.[25] There was a clear understanding that the national units existed primarily as a political and cultural concession to minorities and for the purpose of spreading revolutionary ideals among them—rather than the strengthening of

23. R. Pipes, 'Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics', in R. Denber (ed.), *The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 35–86.

24. Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities*, 34.

25. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Brotherhood in Arms', 28; Smith, 'The Soviet State and Nationalities Policy', 7.

the Soviet armed forces as such.[26] M.V. Frunze, the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, admitted that from a purely military viewpoint, it would have been better to maintain ten divisions of well trained and disciplined Russians than five good divisions and five lower quality divisions recruited on a national basis. However, he conceded that 'the importance of the revolutionary movement of the colonial peoples in their struggle for national independence' could not be overlooked.[27]

These goals were clearly at the centre of the military reforms worked out in the plenary session of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in November 1924, which were then approved by the Third Congress of Soviets in 1925. The reorganisation established national military divisions recruited in the union republics and larger autonomous republics and ethnic units (regiments and smaller) recruited from among smaller ethnic groups as parts of the regular standing army, side by side with the core of small regular cadres made up of Slavs. Also provided for were territorial militia divisions as a form of reserve.[28]

These national divisions and units and reserve militias were formed in all the republics and major autonomous regions over the course of the next decade, but these concessions to the nationalities proved to be fictitious. Except in name and the ethnic origins of their soldiers, the units did not differ from regular (cadre) forces in any other respect. Most were small infantry or cavalry units and all were part of larger regular formations, commanded by Russian officers, although an effort was made in the mid-1920s to train non-Russian officers. By the late 1920s and early 1930s the national formations began to be de-emphasised as part of the centralisation policies pursued by Stalin, the purges of 'bourgeois nationalists' among the leading communist cadres of the republics, and a revival of the Russian national ethos.[29]

Shortages of native command personnel and intractable nationalism had long troubled the national military formations, and they were never considered entirely loyal. The policy was therefore terminated in 1938. At that time, the territorial militia was replaced in Soviet military doctrine with standing formations, and the national units were integrated into the regular army. Part of the Stalinist purges of this period were aimed directly at the native elites in many minority regions, which were accused of deviations of one kind or another. The abolition of the national units, which might have supported these local elites, was a logical element of Stalin's consolidation of ever greater centralised control over the union republics and various ethnic groups. Additionally, the national units were tied to their own areas, and because the Moscow leadership

26. D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944).

27. M.V. Frunze, *Izbrannye proizvedenniia*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1957), 164–5.

28. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Brotherhood in Arms', 35. See also V.V. Gradoselísky, 'Natsionalínye voinskie formirovaniia v Krasnoi Armi' (1918–1938 gg.)', *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* 10 (2001), 2–6.

29. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Brotherhood in Arms', 38.

feared attack in the more Western areas, there was a fear that the national units would not defend areas other than their own. Thus in the interwar period, the policies of the Stalin leadership followed closely the predictions of the garrison state model for an authoritarian state facing imminent external threat.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Conscription of minorities

Soviet military and political preparation for war before the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 was abysmal. The Red Army's command structure had been decimated in the purges of the late 1930s and Soviet defences were totally unprepared for an attack from the West. Nevertheless, Soviet patriotism and the fact that it had gradually been pumped up with Russian national values throughout the previous decade opened up the opportunity to fall back on Russian patriotism, which dominated propaganda during the war. Stalin wanted to be seen as perpetuating the line of great Russian autocrats such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The Soviet leadership therefore called on the heroic epochs of Russian history and its heroes to mobilise the armed forces and the home front, whereas appeals to the history of the other peoples remained very abstract.

Demonstrations were organised in minority regions between November 1941 and September 1942 that were described as 'anti-fascist demonstrations of the peoples' representatives'. There was no real mention anywhere, however, of the living traditions of freedom fighting among the minorities—mainly because these traditions had often developed in defensive struggles against Russian conquerors. Since minorities' patriotic symbols had been used to fight for freedom from Russia, rather than for Russia's freedom, minority patriotism acquired a life of its own that was contrary to the general line of Stalin's nationalities policy. Only the fact that the Soviets needed to mobilise all energies during the war years can explain its resurrection. Nevertheless, even before the end of the war, as we shall see, counter-measures began against this indigenous patriotism.

Thus, even though the first war years did not end the political terror or produce domestic liberalisation, the Soviet leadership felt its very existence threatened. Concessions were therefore granted in these early years of the war to specific social groups and vague rumors were spread of a real domestic new beginning and a thaw after the war. One of the most important of these concessions granted to the nations was the reintroduction of national military units. In August 1941 the first national unit was activated, a Latvian infantry division.

At the start of the German invasion, the Soviet Army was composed officially of ethnically integrated units, although some *de facto* national formations existed as a result of the Soviet conquest of the Baltic states and because the army's reserve system tended to group native servicemen together. Despite its reservations about the reliability of national units, once again the regime quickly resorted to creating them in order to mobilise more of the union's resources in the war effort. During the early part of the war, when much of the Slavic manpower

was under German occupation, the regime needed to gain access to the one manpower pool that was still available: the minority regions, especially Central Asia and the Caucasus, which were still largely unassimilated and where few people spoke Russian. The Soviets were able to mount a successful campaign to raise these national units, although many non-Russians defected to the German side. This factor will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Official recognition of units' specific ethnic character enhanced morale, facilitated command and socialisation tasks, and mobilised the support of the soldiers' home communities. The campaign was launched in union and autonomous republics to mobilise the non-Russians for the defence of the 'motherland'.

Soviet data from the period are somewhat contradictory on the numbers of national divisions, regiments and smaller units, but it appears that from the union republics there were at least two Latvian, two Estonian, three Azerbaijani, four Armenian and four Georgian infantry divisions, and five Uzbek, one Tadzhik, three Kirgiz, two Turkmen, and three Kazakh cavalry divisions[30] (although this contradicts I. Gurvich's figures used in the table below). From the autonomous republics there were at least two Baskir, one Kalmyk, one Chechen–Ingush, and one Kabardino–Balkarian divisions. In addition, there were a considerable number of smaller military units, reserve and support troops. Table 1 identifies the major units by republic and type.

The new national units were different from the pre-1938 formations in that they were made up mostly of non-Russian speakers. Regular Slav officers remained the crucial element of the command structure, but they were assisted by Russian-speaking ethnic personnel.[31] Most NCOs were minority personnel. These units were drafted as an addition to the Red Army's regular plan of mobilisation, and the national territories financed their mobilisation and basic training.[32] This opportunity to raise additional funds for the war effort may have made it easier for the State Defence Committee to agree to the activation of the ethnic units.

Nor were the minority units made entirely, or even primarily, of representatives of the titular minority of the unit. The actual numbers of local nationals among the enlisted personnel varied considerably among the national formations. These numbers decreased dramatically in the course of the units' frontline deployment. Most losses were replaced with regular troops. As an example of this, 40–70 per cent of the eight Transcaucasian divisions were local in 1941, but by 1943–44 that figure had declined to 1–15 per cent.[33] On the other hand

30. Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities*, 184–5. See also V.V. Gradoselísky, 'Natsionalínye voinskie formirivaniia v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voineî', *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* 1 (2002), 18–24.

31. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Brotherhood in Arms', 45.

32. Gurvich, 'K voprosy o slianii', 43f.

33. Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities*, 185.

Table 1

	National Military Units		
Republic	**Rifle Divisions**	**Separate Rifle Brigades**	**Cavalry Divisions**
Azerbaijan SSR	2	0	0
Armenia SSR	3	0	0
Georgia SSR	4	0	0
Kazakhstan SSR	0	2	2
Kirgiz SSR	0	0	3
Latvia SSR	1	0	0
Lithuania SSR	1	0	0
Tadjikistan SSR	0	2	1
Turkmenistan SSR	0	2	2
Uzbekistan SSR	0	9	5
Estonia SSR	2	0	0
Bashkir ASSR	0	0	1
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	0	0	1
Kalmyk ASSR	0	0	2
Chechen-Ingush ASSR	0	0	1

Source: I. Gurvich. 'K voprosy o slianii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny 1941–1945 gg. Na knod etnicheskikh protsessov v SSSR', *Sovietskaia etnografiia* 1 (1976).

men were readily conscripted from reoccupied Belorussian and Ukrainian regions. In March and April 1944, the Sixth Army in Ukraine had mobilised every man in the reoccupied area with the objective of raising the strength of its rifle division to 6000 men. Between March and May 1944 the Second Ukrainian Front took in 265,000 men from the formerly occupied territory. In the same period the Third Ukrainian Front took in 79,000 men. In some units more than half the men were 'booty' troops. The haste with which this effort was undertaken is demonstrated by the fact that the newly acquired soldiers received ten days' training before assignment to combat units.[34]

Thus this pattern, intensifying particularly after the war had turned in the Soviets' favour after the Battle of Kursk in 1943 which brought many Slavic areas back under Soviet control, was part of a larger policy in which the regime moved to reduce non-Slavic participation once the Soviets took the offensive in war. At the same time, it became less necessary or practical to transport recruits from the Caucasus and Central Asia. These patterns are shown in table 2 which outlines the evolution of military units over the course of the Second World War, and clearly demonstrates the shift from non-Slavic to Slavic troops (most notably among Ukrainians).

34. W. Dunn Jr, *Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army, 1930–45* (London: Praeger, 1994), 98.

Table 2

Evolution of Soviet Military Units During the Second World War

Nationality	% in infantry units Jan 1943 –Jan 1944	% in infantry units 1 July 1944	# of losses (in 1000s)	% of general losses	Nationality as % of 1939 census
Russians	62.95	51.78	5747.1	66.3	58.41
Ukrainians	14.52	33.93	1376.5	15.9	16.56
Belorussians	1.9	2.04	251.4	2.9	3.11
Uzbeks	2.88	1.25	121.4	1.4	2.86
Tatars	2.38	1.7	188.3	2.2	2.54
Kazakhs	2.4	1.12	130	1.5	1.83
Jews	1.42	1.14	138.7	1.6	1.78
Azerbaijanis	1.55	0.81	58.1	0.67	1.34
Georgians	1.5	0.5	79.7	0.92	1.33
Armenians	1.51	0.81	83.2	0.96	1.27
Mordvinians	0.79	0.56	63.3	0.73	0.86
Chuvash	0.75	0.52	63.1	0.73	0.81
Tadzhiks	0.48	0.32	22.5	0.26	0.72
Kirghiz	0.57	0.22	26.9	0.31	0.52
Bashkirs	0.5	0.31	32.1	0.37	0.5
Peoples of Dagestan	0.18	0.15	11.3	0.13	0.5
Turkmen	0.47	0.23	21.7	0.25	0.48
Udmurts	0.26	0.2	23.4	0.27	0.36
Chechen-Ingush	0.004	0.03	na	na	0.29
Mari	0.26	0.19	20.8	0.24	0.28
Komi	0.16	0.13	16.5	0.19	0.24
Osetins	0.16	0.14	10.4	0.12	0.21
Karelians	0.09	0.06	na	na	0.15
Kabardino-Balkars	0.06	0.05	na	na	0.13
Kalmyks	0.08	0.06	na	na	0.08
Moldovans	0.04	0.04	53.7	0.62	na
Baltics (Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian)	0.5	0.48	44.2	0.51	na

Source: Compiled from A.P. Artem'ev, 'Iz istorii sudruzhestva narodov SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voene', in M.P. Kim (ed.), *Bratskoe sotrudnichestvo sovetskikh respublik v Khoziaistvennom I kul'turnom stroitel'stve* (Moscow: Progress, 1971); idem, *Bratskii boevoi soiuz narodov SSSR v Velikoi OtechestvennoiVoine* (Moscow: Mysl', 1975); and G.F. Krivosheeva (ed.), *Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina: tsifry i fakti* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1995).

Minority conduct in the war

Thus, a substantial number of national formation and regular divisions containing significant percentages of non-Russians were raised in the various regions of the Soviet Union. The magnitude of the non-Slavic contribution to the war effort, in terms of numbers of men raised, represents marked progress in the ability of the regime to involve all nationalities in its defence. Most importantly, the Soviet government was able to mobilise the minorities at a time when much of its Slavic population was under German control and not available to the Soviet Army. Another important measure of the minority contribution was the extent of participation in the most critical battles and campaigns. National units participated in such critical battles as Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, as well as in campaigns to regain control over the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltics.[35]

Nevertheless, native participation in divisions raised in the minority regions varied greatly, and the involvement of such units in major battles does not necessarily prove that substantial numbers of minorities participated or were critical to the actual fighting. The question of how effectively minorities participated in the war is difficult to answer. Some Western scholars argue that the minorities fought neither efficiently nor effectively and were of questionable loyalty.[36] Table 3 demonstrates the numbers and percentages of recipients of 'Hero of the Soviet Union' awards broken down by ethnicity. Although possibly distorted by an officer class composed predominantly of Slavs, the relatively high percentage of Slavs as compared to other nationalities suggests that minorities might have participated rather less in the frontline combat units overall.

The Soviet experience of recruitment of non-Russian personnel is thus mixed, and cannot have strengthened the Soviets' confidence in the loyalty or reliability of the national minorities. It seems, therefore, that the revival of national formations was nothing more than a temporary expedient that provided for the most effective use of manpower, a temporary concession born of necessity and not a return in any form to the *korenizatsiia* policy.

35. A.P. Artem'ev, *Bratskii boevoi soiuz narodov SSSR v Velikoe Otechestvennoi Voine* (Moscow: Mysl', 1975), 187.

36. Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 60–1. By contrast, Robert Grigor Suny notes that 91 women were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union in the course of the war: Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 323.

Table 3
Hero of the Soviet Union Awards

Nationality	Number of 'Hero of the Soviet Union' Awarded	% of total 'Hero of the Soviet Union' Awards	Nationality as % of 1939 census
Russians	8190	71.27	58.41
Ukranians	2069	18.07	16.56
Belorussians	309	2.70	3.11
Uzbeks	69	0.60	2.86
Tatars	161	1.41	2.54
Kazakhs	96	0.84	1.83
Jews	108	0.94	1.78
Azerbaijanis	43	0.38	1.34
Georgians	90	0.79	1.33
Armenians	90	0.79	1.27
Mordvinians	61	0.53	0.86
Chuvash	44	0.38	0.81
Tadzhiks	14	0.12	0.72
Kirghiz	12	0.08	0.52
Bashkirs	39	0.34	0.5
Peoples of Dagestan	na	na	0.5
Turkmen	18	0.16	0.48
Udmurts	10	0.08	0.36
Chechen-Ingush	na	na	0.29
Mari	16	0.14	0.28
Komi	na	na	0.24
Ossetians	32	0.28	0.21
Karelians	9	0.08	0.15
Kabardino-Balkars	7	0.06	0.13
Kalmyks	8	0.07	0.08
Moldovans	2	0.02	na
Baltics (Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian)	24	0.21	na

Source: Compiled from A.P. Artem'ev, *Bratskii boevoi soiuz narodov SSSR v Velikoi OtechestvennoiVoine* (Moscow: Mysl', 1975); A.G. Koloskov and E.A. Gevurkova (eds), *Istoriia otechestva v dokumentakh 1917-1933 gg., Chast' tret'ia 1939-1945 gg.* (Moscow: ILBI, 1995); and G.F. Krivosheeva (ed.), *Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina: tsifry i fakti* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1995).

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

The Soviet regime at the start of the war clearly suffered from a political vulnerability that derived from the nature of its multi-national state, in which peoples of vastly diverse cultural, political and historical traditions were integrated forcibly into a highly centralised and coercive empire. When strained by war, the artificial bonds tying many of the subject nations to the empire frayed and broke. The military disaster that befell the Red Army in the summer of 1941 was due as much to the disunity, defeatism and hostility toward the system among its peoples and soldiers as it was to the technical superiority and skill of the enemy.[37]

Hostility toward the regime took particularly extreme forms among the national minorities, which was significant as the war was largely fought on non-Russian territory. In many areas, the Germans were regarded as liberators. The German invasion not only failed to arouse the Soviet peoples' unity and will to resist, it unleashed powerful centrifugal forces that threatened to undermine the regime. Many nationalities used the German attack as an opportunity to break away from Russian control.

The Baltic peoples, Western Ukrainians, North Caucasians, large parts of the Georgian and Armenian populations, and substantial numbers of Central Asians and Volga Tatars were prepared to support the invading Germans. Rather than enhancing the internal cohesion and unity of the Soviet Union, the formidable external threat caused significant ethnic fragmentation. For many of these peoples, the Germans were the lesser of two evils, despite their brutality and dismal record of occupation policies. The Soviet policies toward these nationalities as the war turned in Moscow's favour, such as vicious purges and mass deportations, which in some cases reached genocidal proportions, indicate that the regime was clearly aware of the ethnic issue as a central vulnerability of the system.[38]

The Second World War showed the precariousness of the multinational structure. In order to deal with this problem, Stalin observed the weak response to appeals for international solidarity and decided that it was necessary to replace them with an appeal to another kind of solidarity: history, nation and religion, channelled through a particularly Soviet brand of communist ideology. Thus the Soviet leadership renounced completely the prewar emphasis on egalitarianism and established levels of priority for local nationalistic sentiments. At the same time, the war provided an excellent pretext for the elevation of the Russian nation to the top rank and for the exultation of its traditions and culture. As soon as the Germans retreated from the national territories in which autonomous tendencies had appeared, Stalin moved in ruth-

37. Dunn, *Hitler's Nemesis*, 85; Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 69–70.

38. Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 52–3.

lessly. Whole nations were accused of collective crimes and physically devastated through deportation. The German advance toward the Caucasus furnished Stalin with an opportunity to neutralise the Chechens, the Karachai, Ingush and Balkar peoples on the grounds that they were a security threat. More than 400,000 people are believed to have been deported by railway boxcar to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia between November 1943 and March 1944.[39]

By attacking whole nations, Stalin was following the earlier tsarist model of making examples of nationalities and trying to assign different levels to national responsibilities in Soviet life: bad nations versus exemplary ones, with Russia as the most exemplary. These inequalities, justified in Stalinist doctrine by ancient and modern history, were set up as a basic principle for relations among nations following the war. The federation, like the empire before it, grouped many peoples around one guiding people. National cultures were suddenly denounced, as they represented symbols of a reactionary past, and all expression of national culture was attacked and suppressed. Languages were not to be used to convey traditions, at the same time that Russian culture and language were flourishing. Thus Stalin responded to the outburst of nationalism in the war years by imposing a brutal solution on the nations: rapid russification.[40]

This new repression of the national minorities and concurrent withdrawal of the concessions offered during the critical phase of the war continued throughout the postwar period until the Stalin's death in 1953. The *'zhdanovshina'* repression of cultural and intellectual elites and symbols was matched in the military by the demobilisation of the national units and subunits. This process began during the latter stage of the war as more Slavic manpower became available. Although some national units survived until the mid-1950s, most existing national units were disbanded and the personnel were integrated into regular formations of the Soviet Army.

Despite its harshness, this swing back towards the 'garrison state' model of control accomplished its aim, at least temporarily. Stalinism and russification were powerful unifying tools. In the process of working with Russian troops in the military, hundreds of thousands of minority members improved their Russian language skills, which reinforced the politico–economic unity of the Soviet Union.[41] The losses of men during the war caused a skewing of the male–female ratio, which led to a great deal of inter-ethnic marriages, thereby enhancing the

39. R. Conquest, *The Soviet Deportation of the Nationalities* (London: Macmillan, 1960); S. Goldenberg, *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder* (London: Zed Books, 1994).

40. H. d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1978).

41. D. Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 254.

linguistic and ethnic russification of non-Russians.[42] The industrialisation of these areas, particularly Central Asia, also received a boost through the wartime policy of transferring factories from the frontline zones to the peripheral regions. In the Ural and Kuzbass regions considerable numbers of unskilled workers from Central Asia were assimilated into basically Russian cities, replacing Russian workers mobilised by the army.[43] Most importantly, the victory in the war provided a great boost and seeming moral vindication of the Soviet system that was also a powerful unifying force. The war would become the defining moment in Soviet history for generations to follow.

Soviet nationalities' policies after the death of Stalin, as was the case with policies in many other areas, were never as extreme or carried out with the same fervour. Following its consolidation of power, the Khrushchev government recreated a policy similar to the *korenizatsiia* of the New Economic Policy period, and in rhetoric urged nations to resume cultural rights and traditions. Khrushchev reinstated the Balkars, Chechens and other deported nationalities approximately to their former positions, and the era in general appeared less perilous for the minorities. However, while not focussing on overt russification, ideological doctrine during the Khrushchev period continued to stress the idea of eventual '*sliyaniye*' or merging of nations within the context of socialism and the importance of the Russian language as the 'international' [*mezhnatsional'nyi*] language of communication. This dogmatism among ideologists threatened to erase internal borders and dismantle the structures that nationalities had come to regard as shields against ethnic annihilation.

The Brezhnev leadership moved its nationalities policy once again, away from the concessional approach of Khrushchev and once again in the direction of centralised control and repression of national aspirations. Yet this shift toward the 'garrison state' model was neither as extreme as during the Stalin period, nor with regard to the nationality question did it represent as drastic a change of course from the policies of the Khrushchev period. The reason for this lies in the nature of the new version of the *korenizatsiia* policy begun under Khrushchev. While this policy was still based on the idea of the advancement of national cadres in the local political structures of the government, party and military, the difference lay in the choice and qualifications of personnel. Those national cadres that rose in the republican hierarchies in the decades following the war were those who had come up during the war, and had been formed by the experience of their participation in it. Their entry into elite status was a result of minority mobilisation during the war,

42. B. Anderson and B. Silver, 'Demographic Consequences of World War II on the non-Russian Nationalities of the USSR', in S. Linz (ed.), *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985).

43. *Formirovaniye i razvitiye sovetskogo rabochego klassa (1947–1961): Spornik statei* (Moscow, 1964), 264–5; Sh. Munchaev, 'Evakuatsiia naseleniia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny', *Istoriia SSSR* 3 (1975).

and they were loyal to the regime and instilled with Soviet values, or at least had become adept at mouthing the necessary rhetoric. In either case, these national elites were much more assimilated than national cadres had been during the *korenizatsiia* period of the 1920s.[44]

For the first time in Soviet history, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the regime began a conscious policy of creating a common Soviet national identity. It was this Soviet identity, rather than the outright russification of the Stalin period, that became the basis of centralisation and assimilation. Soviet national identity under Brezhnev continued to envision 'fusion' of nations in an abstract sense, yet it was never suggested that the effort be taken to its logical extreme, that of restructuring—or even restricting—the republics' formal sovereignty. What is more, this Soviet national identity was based on the same components that had been continuously important in legitimising the regime: revolution, a social system unique in the world, social welfare and the social definition of human rights, and, most important of all, Soviet victory in the Second World War.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of victory in the war and the common suffering that was endured during the war in both legitimising the regime and in underscoring Soviet national identity. Once again, despite Stalin's repressive policies toward the end of the war and the withdrawal of wartime concessions, the assimilative power of the war experience was enormous. The struggle against fascism brought Russians and the national minorities into a much closer relationship with the Soviet system, and in turn this Soviet identity became much more difficult to separate from traditional ethnic identities. As Suny has pointed out, the Soviet integration of the people, the state and the party was accomplished in a much more complete way than had ever been accomplished before the war.[45] The sense of patriotism and accommodation of national identity, traditions and religion, along with the toning down of revolutionary radicalism, all combined to form an ideological amalgam that was powerful enough to outlast the withdrawal of these very concessions, as well as the end of the Stalinist regime itself.

The nationalities' policy that emerged under Brezhnev represented a sort of mix of the garrison state and resource extraction models. On the one hand, the Brezhnev leadership embarked on a return to the Stalinist paradigm of centralisation and creation of a homogenous Soviet people, while on the other hand this policy was put into effect through the use of assimilated national elites. As Beissinger has noted, national elites who are assimilated into the dominant system of ethnic relations (that is, the Soviet *status quo*) have goals which are

44. For an assessment of this policy in the context of the Ukrainian Republic, see M. Beissinger, 'Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neoimperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared', in Denber (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Reader*, 211–25.

45. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment*, 335.

very different from nationalism or separatism.[46] During the Brezhnev period, ethnic representatives who had been thoroughly assimilated were used to exorcise separatist nationalism. However, while these national elites appeared not to be interested in separatism or nationalist demands for greater economic and cultural autonomy, like elites everywhere in the Brezhnev era Soviet Union, they became increasingly concerned with localism, personal aggrandisement and corruption. This entrenchment of local elites took on a particular ethnic character in the republics, however, as power tended to be consolidated through family and kinship networks that in turn led to ethnic chauvinism.

In the context of the Soviet political and institutional arrangement, this localism and ethnic chauvinism was sufficiently distinct from separatist nationalism to keep the central authorities passive. When a particular republican local leadership took localism and corruption beyond established bounds, or when there was a change in the central leadership, 'anti-corruption' campaigns would be carried and the local leadership removed. This was almost invariably carried out by other local elites of the same nationality, however, and merely resulted in one set of kinship networks being replaced by another. When the foundations of the Soviet political and social institutions began to become undermined during the restructuring of the *perestroika* period, however, the regional elites began to see separatist nationalism as a tool for maintaining power and position, and were often quite able to use nationalist appeals for political support.

CONCLUSIONS

The central leadership throughout Soviet history clearly applied both the garrison state and resource extraction models of state development in its dealings with its ethnic minorities, depending upon the level of threat the regime faced and the composition and aims of the leadership. During the early phases of wars, political rights were often severely restricted with the expansion of censorship, the banning of religious groups, and military administration. However, the scope of wars later forced the mobilisation of a much broader segment of the population. This necessitated concessions to minority groups—the reemergence of national units, for example, in the Civil War and Second World War. Once the threat had passed, however, the regime would sooner or later attempt to withdraw such concessions and revert to the garrison state model.

The irony is, however, that the granting (and then removal) of concessions to national minorities in the Soviet case contributed inevitably to the persistence of ethnic over Soviet identity. The attempt of the regime to root out national and cultural minority identity and transfer loyalty to the federal state and the ruling ideology failed because the granting of concessions limited the sub-

46. Beissinger, 'Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neoimperial Integration', 214.

sequent options open to the regime with regard to nationalities policy. In the bleakest period of the war, the regime had been forced to turn to ethnic minorities. Minority participation in the war, in turn, led to the rise of an assimilated local elite in the republics, capable of playing the game of Soviet politics and maintaining powerful clientele networks and of interacting successfully with the central authorities. Despite the postwar suppression of concessions, there remained the conception that victory in the war was made possible through the cooperation of all of the nationalities, even if the non-Russians were merely minor partners. Although the regime tried later to create a unified Soviet national identity around this achievement, the fact remained that it was precisely this cooperation among ethnic groups that was responsible for the victory. This meant that in order to maintain this source of legitimacy, the central authorities could not replace ethnic cadres in the republics except with other cadres of the same ethnicity. To replace the republican networks of authority with Russians or members of other nationalities to a degree that would uproot these networks effectively would be a large-scale undertaking, and would in turn threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. Finally, the fact that cadres in the republics were ethnically defined undermined the attempts of the regime to create a meaningful conception of citizenship based on Soviet nationality. The practice of defining identity on the basis of ethnicity and nationality that is in evidence throughout Soviet history meant that nationality was a more meaningful concept than citizenship.

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Articles should normally not exceed 10,000 words, exclusive of endnotes. Shorter articles are most welcome. Articles, including notes, should be typed double spaced on one side of A4 paper, with 3 cm margins on both sides. They may be submitted on an IBM or, preferably, an Apple Macintosh disk. They may also be submitted as an email attachment (preferably in rtf) to warsoc@adfa.edu.au.

Detailed style sheets are available on request. In general, the style of articles already published should be followed; follow the *Oxford English Dictionary* for spelling. Single quotation marks should be used, with double marks enclosing quotations within quotations. Dates in the text and in the notes should be written in full: 3 September 1939. Abbreviated forms such as USA should not use full stops between individual letters. Numbers should be written in full to ten, and should have no comma to 9999 but then should be 10,000 and so on.

The following style is required for notes which should be limited to references and not contain substantive information:

1. Pamela M. Graves, *Labour women: women in British working-class politics, 1918–1939* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 52.
2. Daniel J. Sherman, 'Objects of Memory: History and Narrative in French War Museums', *French Historical Studies* 19: 1 (1972), 207-13.
3. Graves, *Labour Women*, 56-7.
4. Ibid., 62.

Thus, for subsequent references use ibid. or a short title as appropriate; do not use op. cit. or loc. cit. Page numbers should not be preceded by p. or pp. Abbreviate chapter as ch. but use vol. only where volume reference is to a composite publication or series title. For archival references, the order should be as follows: Minute by Morrison, 13 October 1942, FO 837/1213.

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